

WA iVote – Final Audit Report

To: David Kerslake, WA Electoral Commissioner

From: Richard Adams

Date: 4 April 2017

Reference: Western Australian State Election, March 2017

As required in your Statement of Work dated March 2016 this document summarises the status of my audit and review.

Review pre-election testing, security and lockdown procedures

I provided feedback on a couple of process matters, most of which have since been addressed.

In relation to the pre-election Logic and Accuracy testing there were some minor operational issues but these did not have an impact on the security and integrity of the system. In fact, they showed that the cross-checking and diagnostic procedures worked well.

I observed the processes and procedures put in place to maintain the security of the iVote system including the physical protection of the equipment to be used for the election and the control of key processes through passwords and encryption. I was satisfied with those processes and procedures.

In relation to the lockdown procedures there was an issue with some of the items on a checklist which is now being amended to reflect a configuration change. I am of the opinion that the lockdown issues have had no material effect on the security and integrity of the iVote system.

It was necessary to unlock the Core Voting System server and the Interactive Voice Response server following the Lockdown process in order to correct two of the issues raised in the Logic and Accuracy tests. I witnessed both events and was satisfied that the security and integrity of the system was maintained.

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I attended and took part in the Decryption Ceremony where I observed that the Approved Procedures were followed and that the checks for the integrity of the votes cast using the iVote system completed successfully and this was confirmed by the independent Comparator. I am therefore happy that the output of the iVote system was a true record of the votes input into that system for the Election.

In my view both the integrity and function of the iVote system was maintained leading up to, and during, the Election.

Limitations

The servers being used for the Election were hosted by the NSW Electoral Commission who also provided the associated disaster recovery facilities. I did not visit either of these sites but I observed key activities undertaken in NSW via a video link or had an independent proxy observe on my behalf and report back to me.

I have not observed incident management testing or attended the WA disaster recovery site but I have observed the setting up and testing of the WAEC equipment to be used in such an event.

Cryptography and system architecture were outside the scope of this audit.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'R Adams', written in a cursive style.

Richard Adams